

THE MINORITY OF ONE

Independent Monthly Publication, Dedicated to the Elimination of All Thought Restrictions Except for the Truth

"There was truth and there was untruth, and if you clung to the truth even against the whole world, you were not mad."—GEORGE ORWELL

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Address for subscriptions and correspondence:
P. O. Box 6594, Richmond 30, Va.

Editor:
M. S. Arnoni

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AN HISTORICAL THEORY

The Summit In Perspective

Many details leading up to the summit conference fiasco will long remain closely guarded secrets. Still, enough is known to detect a general scheme in some international policies of the United States and the Soviet Union.

It is a matter of public record that powerful American and other Western circles have been consistently opposing a diplomatic accommodation with the Soviets. The obstructionists have not been shy or self-conscious about their position. On the contrary, they have been advocating an aggressive policy towards the Soviets with almost unprecedented candor. On the domestic scene these circles have included many official personalities in the Executive as well

as the Legislative Branch. Their chief leaders have been Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates, Jr., Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission John A. McCone and his chief scientist Edward Teller and the Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Clinton P. Anderson. These groups have doubtless been supported by many other officials during executive conferences hermetically sealed against public scrutiny. On the international scene the obstructionists have been led by West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party in Japan.

* * *

Traditionally in American politics, when an administration is internally divided on an important domestic or foreign issue, the two factions develop their arguments before the President who sits as judge above the controversy. In a truly democratic country, position and opposition being incompatible, they cannot possibly join in one and the same government.

Ever since President Eisenhower conceded, during Chairman Khrushchev's visit to this country, that the prevailing situation in Berlin had been "abnormal," the obstructionist faction within the Administration and its foreign allies have undertaken a determined drive to win the President over to their viewpoint. An array of West German officials, including *der Alte* himself, visited the White House. Full page appeals signed by West Berlin's mayor Willy Brandt and other West German personalities were purchased in the American press, calling for a standing pat on the Berlin issue. President Eisenhower was criticized for admitting the situation in Berlin was "abnormal." The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy held hearings that were "doctored" to create the impression of utter futility of any in-

(Continued on Page 8)

The Psychology Behind . . .

"PEACE WITH JUSTICE!"

It takes great men and great times to coin truly inspiring slogans. Assembly line slogans, produced by advertising agencies, may be catchy, tricky, stimulating (just think of the one for white tuna fish: "*Does not get pink in the can!*"), but they are never great. The difference between the product of a professional slogan writer and immortal words uttered by great leaders is as great as that between "*Be sociable, have a Pepsi!*" and the Churchillian "*Blood, sweat and tears!*"

The yearning for peace in this era of mortal dangers has become so compelling that Washington's propaganda machinery can no longer afford to let the "enemy" monopolize all the slogans and symbols of peace. The World Peace Movement and its symbolic dove became objects of fervent jealousy not because of what they actually represent but because of their popular appeal. Presidential ghost writers and speech prompters were given the impossible assignment of coining a slogan with the greatness and appeal of "Peace!" Obviously, someone has won the contest and from that moment on President Eisenhower has not stopped avowing a phrase for which he would like himself, not his speech writer, to be remembered by history: "*Peace with Justice!*" Yet, on closer analysis, we feel the most prudent thing for Eisenhower to do would be to give full authorship credit to the particular ghost writer who, by coining "Peace with Justice!," set out to embarrass the President, either intentionally or unwittingly.

Because first of all that slogan makes it clear that its author or adherer is not totally sold on peace. Peace is not a paramount goal to him; he seeks it only under certain conditions. Such conditioned dedication to peace must not be mistaken for

true dedication to peace. If we accept a qualified striving for peace as true love for peace, then never in history were there any aggressors, any unpeaceful politicians. Even Hitler wanted peace. His desire for peace was tied to *Lebensraum*. Other militarists wanted "peace with glory," or "peace with honor" or peace with something or other. Nor was there any particular reason to doubt the sincerity of such leaders' conditional peace professions. Unless motivated by a sick mind they would adhere to peace any time their conditions for it were voluntarily complied with.

While the yearning for peace is as old as conflicts among men, each time war threatens the slogan of "Peace!" regains its genuine greatness. But, in times of crisis to preach peace with conditions is simply banal; it amounts to no more than a restatement of one antagonist's position. It is deprived, therefore, of the philosophical perspective that may intellectually take a society out of its narrowest and most immediate criteria of judgment.

The fallacy of "Peace with Justice!" is further manifest because peace with justice is impossible. When two parties become antagonists because of their different conceptions of what is just, each one's insist-

(Continued on Page 6)

The Insecure Security Treaty

Rarely was there an international treaty that already at the time of its ratification had fewer chances to last for its formally envisaged duration than the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Nobusuke Kishi proved sufficiently cunning to have the treaty take effect in spite of vigorous opposition that cut across all spheres of Japanese society, including his own conservative elements. His conniving, however, will not ensure the longevity of the treaty; the circumstances under which it was imposed upon Japan bear an inherent moral justification for its eventual unilateral refutation.

Japan's role in the Far East (and specifically towards China), as envisaged in Washington, was supposed to be analogous to West Germany's role vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. What the recent riots made abundantly clear is that the Japanese will not hire themselves out to execute American intentions towards China.

The American Navy is unquestionably a formidable system of physical strength; the political role it has been playing in the Far East is obvious. Yet to rely on the floating fortresses of our 7th Fleet to deny China rights acknowledged as hers by our own allies is not only arrogance but also stupidity.

Eventually, the offshore islands must be politically incorporated into their geographic and national entity, and a world forum, like the United Nations, is doomed to ineffectiveness without the participation of the most numerous nation in the world.

The great economic and technological achievements in China, reported practically everywhere except in the American press, will soon enough turn that country into a nuclear power. Our policy of unnatural containment may not only invite crises hopeless for us in Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and Korea, but eventually bring us face to face with the dilemma of either accepting the total fiasco of our policy or defending it through general war. Least of all should the Chinese be expected to part with the Matsu and Quemoy islands, or for that matter Formosa, permanently.

Our traditional pattern of denying the Chinese their inherent national rights and then, when they become militant, condemning them as aggressors whose resort to force may not be rewarded, will eventually be challenged with such force, both of international conviction and Chinese might, that neither Chiang Kai-

shek nor our fleet will suffice to perpetuate it.

When this happens, we will find ourselves politically isolated. Kishi will not be around to supplant Japanese security by Pentagon designs, and Great Britain's misgivings need not wait until a Far Eastern war erupts; they are quite vocal right now.

Washington's disinclination to adapt its Far Eastern policy to unavoidable developments in the area is more than political naivete; it is an attempt at breeding a conflict with disastrous consequences even less avoidable than in the case of Berlin. Berlin can potentially serve as a pretext for either small or big conflicts; but our insistence that China remain an amputated body can only beget a world-scale conflict.

The trickery involved in imposing our military "protection" upon Japan will prove shortsighted unless Japanese reluctance and restlessness shock us into a long overdue reversal of basic policy.

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Adolf Eichmann, You And I

In approaching the subject of Adolf Eichmann we should in full fairness—and fairness we owe Eichmann as much as anybody else—warn the reader of all our personal disqualifications for judging him. No victim should ever be accepted as the judge of his victimizer and one who, like this writer, has suffered six years in German Ghettos and concentration camps where his closest of kin and everybody he knew were wiped out, can least of all be trusted to master any degree of personal detachment and objectivity towards the Nazi arch-criminal. At the most he should be heard as a witness, but under no circumstances should he sit in judgment.

This principle applies not only to this writer: it is even more relevant with regard to the State of Israel where Eichmann is imprisoned awaiting trial. There are many reasons—historic, legal and moral—why the State of Israel should refrain from passing judgment on Eichmann; one of them is that its entire population, the state bureaucracy included, qualifies as the prisoner's accuser rather than his judge. No exceptional circumstances may invalidate this criterion of fairness, because if exceptional circumstances should be allowed to upset elementary rules of fair play, we too would be embracing the very lawlessness that made the Third Reich's crimes possible in the first place.

This does not mean that the Government of Israel should not bring Eichmann before Israeli courts. Indeed, the very act of doing so assumes a symbolic significance that will probably for centuries inspire dramaturgies in all languages. The Israeli judiciary, however, will achieve true greatness in disqualifying itself, after hearing the case, from passing judgment. It could thus prove that even the strongest emotional temptation can be overcome by sound rational restraint. This in itself would be a demonstration of one of the qualities that our world needs most: the ability to grant equal fairness to foe and friend, without letting rational humanism be perverted by emotion, vengeance and self-righteousness.

The Israeli courts should also disqualify themselves for other reasons. That some of those reasons are only legal technicalities does not remove their applicability just because of the magnitude of the defendant's crimes. The circumstances under which Eichmann was brought to Israel remain something of a puzzle even after its Government's denial of forced abduction. While the exceptional nature of the case makes understandable any way in which Eichmann was made to step on Israeli soil, no judiciary may accept an equally tolerant attitude if rule of law is to be given precedence over the satisfaction of punishing the executioner of a large portion of the Jewish people. Whether the criminal is an Eichmann or one guilty of inconsequential burglary the sanctity of law must be preserved with equal fidelity.

The formal grounds, however, in Argentina's demand for Eichmann's return are offset by that country's notorious codding of Nazis ever since the end of World War II.

Then too, there is a wider moral issue. The judging of Eichmann must not be turned into a peripheral side show between the Jewish people and its arch-enemy. The account is much broader. It figures in the account books of history and of the entire world. Under no circumstances may we resign ourselves to the proposition that the killing of innocent human beings leaves nothing but an account to be settled between the victims' orphans and the killer. Rather this is a matter of world conscience. Mankind must not be denied the opportunity of somewhat purging itself of its own guilt as a passive bystander at one of the most horrendous tragedies in history. The international community must be given a chance to address itself to Eichmann and his crimes, and Jewish vindictiveness must be forfeited in favor of such an opportunity.

The most important aspect of the Eichmann case is one that has least chance of gaining proper consideration. Eichmann provides the opportunity for a truly philosophical re-examination of the wisdom with which man has arranged his relations with fellow men, and society with fellow societies. We may punish Eichmann to the degree that that is possible,

but this in itself would achieve nothing. He is not likely to have an opportunity for becoming a recidivist. This does not mean that there are no other Eichmanns around against whose horrendous potential the world must brace itself. They are present in each and every nation and the most dangerous among them are afforded as much official status and social prestige as Eichmann got in his days of horrifying "glory". From the performance of the Nazi we must learn how to avoid any possibility of our own unwitting acceptance of his moral endowment. We must ask ourselves—not our next-door neighbor or our next-boundary nation but ourselves—how did the German nation fall into this inhuman abyss and are we ourselves sufficiently immune to similar dehumanization?

In this respect the picture is worrisome indeed and it seems that our forgetfulness towards Nazi crimes and victims forestalls any change in the psychological basis that gave birth to genocide. The Nazis had an uncompromising hatred for Jews, Slavs and other "inferior" people. They saw other nations as set on the destruction of Germany; their final moral perspective was whether an act benefited Germany, and Germany alone, or not. This attitude ultimately led them to the commission of untold crimes. How removed is our own thinking from theirs? Aren't there people we consider basically and natively our inferiors—be they the Negroes to a domestic bigot or the Russians to many a domestic "liberal"? Don't we too conceive of "enemies" who, desiring nothing but to wipe us out, deserve to be wiped out? And, don't we believe that whatever serves America is right and justified? How dissimilar is our own capacity for hatred from that of yesterday's Nazi?

Yesterday, the victims were Jews. Today, they are Negroes. There is no consolation that in the latter case "only" individual murders are involved. As long as we have the psychological capacity for committing self-righteous murders, only external circumstances control how many times the act of murder will be multiplied. Tomorrow the victims may be Russians exterminated by Americans, or Americans exterminated by Russians. The capture of Eichmann and his trial provide occasions for man to learn the lesson he has been stubbornly resisting ever since the Nazi atrocities were first revealed.

The need to learn that lesson is paramount. Man's punishment for refusing to heed historic warnings might be catastrophic once more. We will keep on hating and rationalizing our right to hate. And as long as we reason thus, so long are we potential murderers, basically no different from Adolf Eichmann.

With all these broad implications in the historic Eichmann phenomenon, the man Eichmann still remains to be coped with.

So much must be learned about the phenomenon Eichmann that confining him to an ordinary prison would hardly serve humanity. Eichmann cannot expiate his sins, but he could be made the object of most thorough psychological studies, pos-

THE BRIGHTER SIDE

Three Cheers

► FOR FORMER SENATOR WILLIAM BENTON'S proposal that 10,000 Soviet graduate students be exchanged annually for 10,000 American students.

► FOR THE U. S. STATE DEPARTMENT for supporting a report of the Peace Committee of the Organization of American States censuring the violations of human rights by the dictatorship in the Dominican "Republic".

► FOR INDUSTRIALIST CYRUS EATON'S continued drive for United States-Soviet collaboration.

► FOR REPRESENTATIVE EUGENE SILER for calling on the House for passage of a law requiring full disclosure of all congressional spending.

► FOR THE U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES for restoring authority for the India-Pakistan Indus River project previously eliminated from the foreign aid bill by the House Appropriations Committee.

► FOR THE U. S. COURT OF APPEALS for curbing the semi-dictatorial powers of the chief of three court-appointed monitors of the Teamsters Union.

► FOR THOMAS E. MURRAY, former Atomic Energy Commissioner, for advocating the establishment of an international agency with the purpose of dismantling, megaton for megaton, the atomic bombs of East and West.

► FOR THE AMERICAN UNITARIAN ASSOCIATION for passing a resolution at its annual meeting urging recognition of China by the governments of the United States and Canada.

► FOR PROF. LINUS PAULING, a noted chemist and Nobel prize winner, for his courageous campaign against nuclear weapons and for his equally courageous standing up to the harassment of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

► FOR ROSEANNA ROBINSON who, after a 93-day hunger strike, was released from a Federal Reformatory for Women where she had been confined for refusing to pay taxes in protest against armaments.

► FOR THE NEGRO SIT-IN MOVEMENT on its victory in desegregating lunch counters in a number of department and drug stores in Northern Virginia.

► FOR THE U. S. COURT OF APPEALS for setting aside a construction permit for an atomic plant near Detroit, Mich., issued by the Atomic Energy Commission without adequate safety provisions.

► FOR THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT NATIONS OF THE MALI FEDERATION, SOMALILAND (British), CHAD, THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, GABON, MADAGASCAR, THE CONGO REPUBLIC (Belgian), CONGO AND SOMALIA (Italian).

sibly to discover which notions of his we share that may potentially turn us into his spiritual successors. He could be turned into a kind of a one-man museum for psychologists and philosophers to seek our own reflection in him. He could be preserved as an exhibition piece, available for demonstrations and study by qualified people in search of the origins of blind hatred and atrocious capacities.

But even towards that atrocious mass murderer principles must apply that will save us from the inevitable self-degradation of destroying others. If man's arrogance should stop short of claiming the privilege to take another man's life, then this principle applies to Eichmann as much as to any ordinary criminal, or for that matter to any foreign youth we might be sent to meet with a bayonet at a front line. Eichmann's victims cannot be helped and claiming his life will not restore a single one of theirs. But in dealing with him we may learn to remove ourselves from the very immoral premise that, if continued, will keep the Eichmann specie and dynasty ever present among men. There is a horrible atavism in history that provides a moral meeting ground between

victim and victimizer. The victimizer annihilates the victim for whatever wrong he found in him, and in the act of annihilation he inherits the victim's allegedly evil spirit. We must find a way out of that vicious circle of self-destroying human psychology, and Eichmann should be spared not for his but for our own sake. Let us not become killers no matter how justified the killing might seem to us!

It would be too much to expect complete objectivity and lack of vindictiveness on the part of Israel. Yet, anyone acquainted with the young state must be thoroughly impressed by its nearly perfect judiciary and its complete integrity. This has been demonstrated time and again in cases involving hostile Arab infiltrators and saboteurs. This near-perfection is not inherent in the governmental system; much rather it is due to a small group of people that make up the judiciary. It is just possible that their own integrity and moral heights will suffice to make them deliver Eichmann to the world, possibly making Germany its agent in this case, as a *MENTO MORI*.

CONVENTIONAL THINKING AND NUCLEAR AGE

Some people are conservative in their thinking, some are radical. Still others are so dogmatically radical that in effect it amounts to another brand of conservatism. Such people tend to dismiss anything that is not new and original as being wrong. In actuality, any thought whose correctness is tested by the method of arriving at it rather than on its own merit remains an untested thought. A conclusion is neither right nor wrong on the basis of its consistency with tradition. Nor do novelty and originality have any inherent validity. A thought may be good or bad whether or not it is new.

This piece of propaedeutics must be borne in mind when one undertakes to speculate on anything pertaining to a third world war. We are often told that just because atomic fission is something revolutionary in human experimentation, all conventional thinking must be disregarded when speculating on a nuclear war. To us it seems that such a call for automatically novel thinking is a new kind of "revolutionary conservatism" which, unfortunately, may cost us not only some wisdom but possibly also many lives.

First, the idea that war has become too costly to still be possible may not only be an exaggeration; it may also be a propagandistic way of desensitizing the population to the imminence of war in order to prevent any determined drive against the possibility of its outbreak. If war is impossible, then war-preventing action is unnecessary.

Military authorities have estimated that an all-out nuclear attack on the United States would cause about forty million American casualties; such a ratio of casualties would certainly be considered quite tolerable by our war gods. Indeed, such a dimension of loss of human lives would not be radically new. During World War II the Soviets lost about twenty-seven million people; obviously, they did not consider that price too high to defend their national sovereignty. The Soviet population before World War II was about the same as America's present population. If one nation was willing to sacrifice almost fifteen per cent of its members to obtain its objectives, it can hardly be taken for granted that under changed circumstances another nation would consider a sacrifice of twenty or twenty-five per cent as intolerable.

Another attempt at radical thinking presents a future war as a very brief one. Similar predictions preceded World War I and World War II. Chances are that even a nuclear war would not be a *totally* nuclear war. As in the past so in the future, war will require tactical as well as strategic operations and weapons. No war was ever brought to an end by strategic or tactical means alone. And as long as this duality of operations is necessary, a

real *Blitzkrieg* is impossible. Even a nuclear war will require prolonged invading, mopping, and occupying operations for whose achievement strategic means would be unfeasible, impractical, even impossible.

Along with the production of nuclear bombs intensive efforts are going into the development of bacteriological weapons which, obviously, are not intended to produce immediate destruction or prepare a territory for imminent invasion. Such weapons are intended for a slow process of wearing out the enemy's population rather than for spectacular victories. Even after a prolonged period of destruction by epidemics the invader would hesitate to move his forces into the contaminated area until it became relatively safe to do so.

From all this it becomes apparent that even a nuclear war is not just a matter of throwing a few high potency bombs. Such operations may well amount to the future Verduns and Battles of the Bulge, but by no means will they exhaust all war activities. If, therefore, World War III breaks out, it will be still another war that will last for years.

Another attempt at "new," "unconventional," perhaps "nuclear" thinking presents war destruction as being so total that no one could conceivably benefit from it. What good would it be, so this saga goes, to occupy a foreign country when all it had to offer to the victor would be ruins and radiation? This claim too seems to be merely an exaggerated tranquilizer whose purpose is to avert determined drives against war. But past human experience permits us to indulge in no such novel "optimism". If Russia, after losing about 15 per cent of her population in World War II, succeeded within a few years in rebuilding and even vastly exceeding her pre-war economy (and the same holds true with Great Britain, Germany and Japan), would war be considered impossible by the ultimate decision makers just because post-war rehabilitation would have to take, let's say, twice as long?

While, undoubtedly, the destruction of a nuclear war would exceed by far the horrible destruction of all previous wars, the stakes in World War III may seem too great in some circles to resist temptation, regardless of the risks. Possibly nuclear war has become too destructive to risk for the sake of a single market for the industry of one nation or another. Possibly it has become too dangerous to be waged for the sake of gaining minerals in one territory or another. This does not mean, however, that it would necessarily be too dear if the stakes were the preservation of the very system of economic aggrandizement.

If the plutocracy is regretfully resigned to peace rather than risk the dangers in-

volved in regaining the gigantic Chinese market, it does not mean that it would also resign itself to peace if the price were its total abdication from power and wealth.

The true motive behind peace obstructionism seems to be that our power elite, without openly admitting it, believes Mr. Khrushchev on certain matters much more than its own public spokesmen. Khrushchev's notorious "*We will bury you!*" gained much attention in the West even though he was not misunderstood. His explanation, during his visit to the U.S.A., that he did not have in mind the literal act was utterly superfluous and consoled no one among our power elite. What was so worrisome was the clear implication that the Soviet system was going to outdo our own.

Comparing Soviet and Chinese progress in economics, education and technology with the demoralization of our "fulfilled society," to borrow Walter Lippmann's phrase, our plutocrats take Khrushchev's challenge much more seriously than they dare admit in public. Their complete lack of self-confidence with regard to peaceful economic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union is an attitude born of intelligent judgment, not hysteria.

I recently talked with a man whose outlook provided considerable insight into the mentality of our power elite in this respect. When I argued that our part in negotiating disarmament seems to have fallen short of candor and sincerity, the man said: "*Of course, we have reason to oppose disarmament. Just imagine two guys protecting themselves against each other with guns. Now, somebody suggests they both throw away the guns and stop living in terror. On the surface this seems a fair and just suggestion. Except that one of the guys is a real husky giant, while the other is a weak little fellow. As long as they have guns in their hands there is a balance of terror between them because both are equally capable of pulling a trigger. Without the guns, however, the giant will crush the little guy.*" The analogy was indeed very apt and pertinent. But, as I pointed out to my disputant, applying it to Soviet-U. S. relations, the superior muscles of the one disarmed man represented, not muscles, but superior economics, education, sense of values and social structure. "*True—said the man—but you cannot expect us voluntarily to submit to anyone's superiority just because it is real and good.*" And indeed, this is the last thing I would suggest. Except that I cannot resign myself to the pessimistic view that the weaknesses and decadence of our society is unalterable any more than I can accept the optimistic view that what the Soviets represent is the ultimate achievement in human development.

In our own society there seems to be so much wrong that it should be relatively easy to determine areas of challenge, and the Soviet example provides valuable dramatizations of what should be avoided so that a much juster and happier reformism could emerge.

But the real trouble is that any reformism that would strengthen our society and its foundations would necessitate the abdication of the plutocracy. Only then could the dormant forces in our society and its intellectual values assert themselves as the real carriers of human progress and development.

But our plutocracy, like most people, cares little how it dies. It has no preference as to the circumstances of its deposition. It wants simply to keep matters as they are without parting with its basic privileges. It has no intention to abdicate—whether to Khrushchev or to the American people. If anything, Khrushchev might pose a less irrevocable way out than domestic abdication from power and influence. Once their power is taken from them by the American people, nothing could change this. But if they had to surrender this power to a foreign nation, it would follow a military struggle out of which our plutocracy might seize a last chance to preserve its position. Anyway, a maybe is better than a won't be.

No matter how weak the "maybe," when the only alternative is "won't be" one is bound to decide in its favor. That remote possibility of our plutocracy's self-preservation may well lead us to war to destroy a system which is neither right nor acceptable to us but which nevertheless challenges all men to progress. And before the great struggle is over, that very power elite that started it may no longer be around to become either victor or vanquished.

The psychological trance in which the American nation has been artificially but successfully kept has its limitations. It is based on too many falsehoods and fallacies, deceptive assumptions and corrupt attitudes to withstand all crises. A severe economic crisis suffices to awaken large portions of this nation to reality, as 1929 and the ensuing New Deal testify. How much greater might the awakening be under the trying conditions of modern war? Indeed, to expect that, under the conditions of a nuclear war with all the devastation it would bring, the American people would stupidly keep adhering to the sanctity of a rented out status quo is as unrealistic as to expect a whole world to stop moving just so as not to upset the business of some American firms.

This unrealism, however, is still not going to make our power elite give up a "maybe" in favor of immediate abdication. And because of this desperation, the destructiveness of a nuclear war is not only a possibility but the underlying inspiration of many of our Government's actions. The very war, which by virtue of technological development is so often alleged to be impossible, is made most probable as the only chance to perpetuate the privileges of a single class.

The Revolt Against Quislings

The overthrow of the Syngman Rhee regime in Korea started an international chain reaction that was bound to occur sooner or later. Were it not for the domestic issues involved in the fermentation in Korea, Turkey and Japan, the whole process could have been postponed so as eventually to start in the very midst of a third world war if and when it breaks out.

Basically these are revolutions against post-World War II Quislings that have been imposed upon some of the "free" nations. While we have been depicting the relationship between the East European regimes and the Soviet Union as that of satellites and overlord, the alleged equality between the United States and its own allies has been problematic throughout. This imbalance has been achieved by economic, political and military means. American officialdom and the press have, with unflinching persistency, construed any Soviet trade relations with "free" nations as politically inspired penetrations. Our own economic and military aid, however, is hardly ever admitted to be a means of increasing the dependence of our allies. Only here and there, when the Administration has advocated economic and military aid before Congress, has its non-philanthropic nature been admitted.

A situation has developed whereby the actual oath of allegiance many a foreign head of government takes amounts, in essence, to an oath of allegiance—not to his own nation and its constitution—but to the United States of America. This has been most dramatically the case with Konrad Adenauer of Germany and Prime Minister Kishi of Japan.

From the point of view of historic juncture as well as by virtue of popular consensus of opinion the number one national objective of the Germans in the post-World War II reality has been the reunification of their country. Yet, the most basic consequence of Adenauer's policies has been to make that reunification absolutely impossible. What Adenauer agreed to trade was Germany's number one national objective in return for the "privilege" of being the United States' closest anti-Soviet ally.

With the Japanese no less a compromise of national objectives was involved. The price of Japan's military alliance with the United States has been its Government's circumvention of the letter and spirit of Japan's post-war constitution. A nation that, after military surrender, was forced to renounce warfare as an extension of its diplomacy has been led to execute no policy with more fervor than that of undoing the new constitutional pacifism. Ironically this did not result from a nationalistic reaction to foreign-imposed principles. On the contrary, having surrendered unconditionally, the Japanese were ready to live up to the conqueror's dictum; but the conquerer did not let them do so.

Nor are Germany and Japan isolated cases. To a lesser degree the sacrifice of national sovereignty was involved with other American allies as well. Even the most powerful among them, the United Kingdom, was not spared American satellite status, witness the downfall of Prime Minister Eden when his policy in the Suez crisis ran contrary to our State Department.

Also certain small nations bordering on the Soviet Union, whose obvious national interest would be to get along with their ominous neighbor, have been led to believe they could pursue instead an aggressive, provocative policy. Pakistan, Turkey, Greece and Norway, whose very geographic location dictates a policy of neutrality—since only neutrality offers them a chance to survive in a general war even if the ultimate victor should be the United States—have not only adopted anti-Soviet political but even military policies.

Within the Atlantic Alliance and its periphery it has been implied and understood that cooperation with the United States must include a country's readiness to be sacrificed for the sake of its American leader. Indeed, this was Washington's essential condition for any cooperation, an insistence backed by possible economic, political and military pressures.

The surrender of national discretion was quite tragically exhibited following the U-2 incident and the fiasco of the summit conference. While popular sentiment in America's customer-nations was decidedly opposed to the American role, and in private even official circles joined in this critical attitude, officially, Britain and France and our other allies saw no choice but to back America. Even relatively weak nations like Turkey, Pakistan and Norway, who found themselves right in the midst of the fire with which the State Department was playing, heeded, not their immediate national interests, but Washington's dictum. Their protests were no more than a formality that everyone knew not to take literally or seriously.

Obviously, the surrender of national interests to the political and military objectives of the American "protector" will be put to the severest test in the event of actual war. It is one thing for a nation to ignore its basic security interests in peacetime, when popular reluctance can be coped with by prolonged propagandistic and police measures, but another thing in wartime, when the nation must pay instantly for foreign policy blunders. There can be no doubt that in the event of war many of America's carefully nursed alliances would fail to pass the test of actual experience. In such situations the peoples of the warring governments would, with intolerant urgency, demand to know why they had to absorb nuclear blows in a war in which their own chance of victory was non-existent. Under such hypothetical circumstances many an allied

government could be expected to make an agonizing reappraisal of the part it wished to play on America's side. Were it not to make such a reappraisal, chances are that that government would be overthrown.

This much could be expected, and our insistence that nuclear weapons on allied soil be manned only by American forces testifies to Washington's awareness of it. But that this agonizing reappraisal would start taking place short of war was much less anticipated. Yet, this is precisely what happened in the Iraqi revolution and, though less explicit, the same kind of basic revisionism of national purpose was involved in the anti-Rhee and anti-Menderes rebellions as well as in the vigorous internal struggle in Japan. But even in those allied countries where no such eruption has yet occurred forces are at work for a similar agonizing reappraisal.

These anti-Quisling forces of national self-assertion are by no means monolithic and in most countries the Communists play no significant role among them*. Politically they vary from the British, largely Labor Party, advocates of unilateral British disarmament all the way to active supporters of the Western cold war who demand cooperation within the Atlantic Alliance to replace what they presently conceive of as American political and military domination. The latter position greatly reflects General de Gaulle's sentiments. These self-assertive forces range from the left all the way to the extreme right and the fact that most of them are distinctly anti-communist testifies that, more than political tendencies, the problem is


*Typical of the composure of such movements is a June 12th Associated Press news dispatch from Tokyo, describing a demonstration against the new U.S.-Japan Security Treaty: "Marching sometimes 30 abreast, the columns—including workers, actors, artists, teachers, farmers, Communists, Socialists and fanatical university students—paraded riotously. Buddhist priests, hymn singing Christians and hundreds of women joined in." This elaboration notwithstanding, the dispatch kept referring throughout to "leftist demonstrations."

one of national sovereignty.

Although the rebellion against supplanting the allies' national interests by State Department policies started in Iraq, the movement gained significant momentum with the overthrow of Syngman Rhee in Korea. The Korean riots were followed by unexpectedly successful demonstrations in Turkey. In Japan, popular opposition to the new military treaty with the U.S. and to President Eisenhower's visit became forceful. There is no telling which country the torrent will sweep next. Not everywhere does the trend have to be of a physically rebellious nature. The hypothetical advent to power of the Labor Party in England could be no less significant internationally than the violent overthrow of the regimes in Korea and Turkey. General de Gaulle's policies, if they become just a bit more extreme, may serve the same international tendency. A post-Adenauer Germany poses quite a

question mark and its Social Democrats, dedicated to the reunification of their country as they are, would undoubtedly at least weigh the paramountcy of unification against American-German ties.

These developments are intriguingly fascinating not for their spectacular or sensational effect but because potentially they are the most significant war deterrents. An isolated American-Soviet war is at the very least most improbable. Without the cushioning of punch-absorbing allies and without their strategic bases the American war lobby might finally be forced into a reappraisal of its international intentions. Western unity, an accepted misnomer for using allies to serve Washington-determined international goals, may well be an indispensable condition for allied physical strength, but when it comes to preserving peace, the opposite of such "unity" may be the precise blessing on which all hopes must be pinned.



"Forsooth, what hath happened to Sir Rhee and Sir Menderes?"

"Peace with Justice" (Continued from Page 1)

ence that his brand of justice prevail is the surest way to war. Under such circumstances the only way to preserve peace is for the peaceseekers to compromise their concepts of justice. Although no national leader ever professed love for war per se, adherence to peace *only* if one's concept of justice can be reconciled with it is an almost exact definition of advocating war.

"Peace with Justice!" as a slogan also provides its advocate with an opportunity not to work for peace at all. Had he advocated peace and peace alone, his constituents might hold him accountable for not bringing it about. A conditional peace profession, however, provides an inherent excuse that peace was not brought about because the conditions for it were not fulfilled. This is the more valid in the case at hand because, the condition being justice, one can safely assume that within the foreseeable future there will always be the opportunity to invoke the prevalence

of injustice. Perfect justice is an experience thus far unknown to the human specie, especially on a world wide scale. That is why making peace depend on justice constitutes no limitation at all upon the alternative of resorting to war. If, as "Peace with Justice!" implies, warfare is legitimate as long as there is no justice, it would be hard to imagine any realistic conditions under which warfare would become illegitimate.

Our President certainly does not claim the world to be in a state of justice at present. Yet he does not, at least for the time being, engage in war. "Peace with Justice!", however, seems to leave it within his own discretion whether and when prevailing injustices should be challenged by the might of arms. If the only condition for renunciation of war is justice, then a definite claim is laid to the right of provoking war at any time. This slogan actually absolves the government of any responsibility for peace.

These generalities acquire an even greater pessimistic substance when concretely applied to present international relations. The two concepts of justice, the American and the Soviet, are absolutely irreconcilable—both as social philosophies and in international relations. The very first stages of applying our concepts of justice to international relations would require the severance of all Soviet foreign influence. The governments of East Europe that are friendly to the Soviets would have to resign and let governments friendly to us take over. Even the territorial integrity of the U.S.S.R. would not remain intact. Large portions, presently incorporated in the Soviet Union, would be declared independent, presumably with governments friendly to us. The Chinese Government, which is altogether illegitimate in our official position, would have to disband, allowing Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to take over. And there would have to be many other similar international adjustments.

Also internal life in Russia would have to undergo basic changes to meet our official philosophy of "justice." First of all its government would have to liquidate itself as an intolerable tyranny. A minute before committing suicide, the present leaders of the Soviet Union would have to install in office their irreconcilable enemies who presently, as friendly aliens and political refugees, are employed by our State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Of course, not less radical changes would have to take place in America and throughout the world in order to satisfy the Soviet concept of justice. Not only would American influence anywhere in the world have to be given up, but Florida might conceivably become a Cuban province. Our government would have to resign and before resigning install a Moscow protege in the presidency of the U.S.

Ridiculous? Of course, but still consistent with the mutually opposed concepts of justice. And because the fulfillment of either concept of justice through voluntary compliance is utterly unthinkable, the only way it could be realized would be through war. Demanding, therefore, peace with the Soviets provided they let us institute justice as we understand it, amounts in substance to an advocacy of war. Had the Soviets, in turn, insisted on peace provided we accept what they understand under justice, in substance such an insistence, too, would be nothing but a shrewdly concealed determination for war.

Had the President pledged peace alone to the American people, he would have many embarrassing questions to answer. He would have to tell us why our preparations for peace include forty billion dollars annually on murder weapons; why his diplomatic representatives have not met the Soviets half way in negotiations regarding disarmament and a nuclear ban; why we are building military bases thousands of miles from home; why we conceive of disarmament as so impossible as not even to prepare alternative premises for our industry and economy; why we are arming the West Germans and coercing the Japanese to become militarists once again. But a president who has pledged not peace but "Peace with Justice!" cannot be accused of not keeping his word: in the absence of "justice," he is not pledged to peace.

It would be a mistake to blame the anonymous speech writer for creating "Peace with Justice!" The work of any artist is limited by the materials he has to work with. With the prevailing political mentality of our national leadership, no poet or writer could have come up with a more meaningful, more genuine slogan. A slogan is only a symptom of the situation to which it responds; its origins are rooted in the very depths of thought and emotion of those who create and embrace it. The problem, therefore, is not one of choice of words: the inconsistency between advocating peace and elaborating absolute moral conditions for it parallels and reflects the inconsistency between our national self-righteousness and our behavior in the international community.

MANKIND'S GREATEST CREATION: MAN

By Robert Anton Wilson

"Europe has always had the best and oldest universities. It has produced the world's greatest books and ideas: liberty, human dignity, fraternity. European universities are supposed to be the cradle of civilization. And yet the true European education we receive is gas chambers, rape, slavery and firing squads at dawn."

These bitter words set the tone for the latest novel by Romain Gary, French diplomat-author-soldier whose previous novels, *The Roots of Heaven* and *Lady L.*, have already been popular and critical successes both in France and America.

A European Education deals with one year in the lives of a small band of Polish

A European Education
By Romain Gary
Simon & Shuster, New York
1960—240 pp., \$3.75

partisans during the Nazi occupation. The hero is a boy of fourteen, Janek Twardowski, who joins the partisans after his father is killed for single-handedly walking into a Nazi brothel with a machine gun, in a vain attempt to liberate his mother from captivity there. Janek doesn't know this. All he knows is that first his mother and then his father disappeared, and that "the Germans" are responsible.

Except for knowing these things, young Janek lives mostly in a pre-adolescent dream-world, where he is "Old Shatterhand" the Indian Scout and is accompanied by an imaginary friend "Winetoo, the Red Indian Gentleman," characters out of a boy's book. His gradual breaking away from this fantasy and his "education" to the reality around him makes up the subject of the novel.

Inevitably, one is reminded of other novels of growing up—*Huckleberry Finn*, *Catcher in the Rye*, *Doctor Sax*, *Intruder in the Dust*. It should be said at once that *A European Education* bears comparison with any one of these books, even with *Huckleberry Finn*.

What M. Gary is saying in this short but panoramic novel seems to be two things: (1) that man cannot live without inventing some romantic myth to sustain his efforts; and (2) that man cannot live well without trying, in anguish and heroism, to make the myth come true.

Thus, Pan Josef Konieczny, the innkeeper, despises the romanticism of the partisans. Considering himself a realist, he tries to make the best of things as they are, and unashamedly collaborates with the Nazis. His bootlicking brings him to a moment no reader of the book will ever forget, when a Nazi climbs into bed with Mrs. Konieczny and curtly tells Pan Josef, "Hold the candle." In that terrible light Pan Josef sees what his "realism" has wrought and he commits suicide.

Many of the partisans die by violence, too, but they do not die *spiritually* and *morally*, as Pan Josef dies. Many of them suspect the romanticism and unreality of

their cause—"We live by fairy-tales," the hero says bitterly, at one point—but they know that, to remain men, they must try to make the fairy tales come true.

The principle fairy tale of Western Civilization, created by the Greeks and revived by Jefferson and the French rationalists, is the myth of the innate goodness and rationality of man. Romain Gary, like everyone who has lived through the Nazi Era, knows that this is a myth. When a German soldier of more-than-usual humanity deserts his army and comes to join the partisans, a shocking thing happens. The partisans know that this man means well—that he is a hero who has transcended nationalism and other corrupt superstitions and who is taking a daring stand for the brotherhood of man—but they have suffered too much, they have too much rage in them. They refuse to admit that they believe in the German's sincerity, and they murder him.

But a myth, once created, is not easy to destroy. The partisans, in order to survive, need their myth of human decency and rationality. The most beautiful and deeply moving aspect of this novel is the slow, chapter-by-chapter process by which the small partisan band grows into a group of true heroes who truly embody myths of virtue, rationality and decency we all try to believe in. At the end, the leader of the band, Dobranski, lies dying of a bullet wound and speaking rapturously of the world of peace and justice that will be born after the war. The Russians and Americans will make a just peace, he says. They will rule the world together in peace and decency; there will be no more wars, hunger, injustice. . . .

"How many nightingales, Janek thought, had thus sung through the ages at the darkest hours of mankind on the earth? How many human nightingales had died with this beautiful song on their lips? How many more would die in cold and suffering, in scorn and hatred and loneliness, before the promise of their golden voices would be fulfilled? How many centuries more? How many killed and born? How many prayers and dreams—how many nightingales? How many tears and songs? How many nightingales?"

It is possible to see nothing but the irony of this ending. Dobranski's paradise never arrived; Poland is still not free; and the Russians and Americans are ruling the world, not in peace and justice, but in fear and radioactive fallout. Yet, with the whole body of this novel behind it, Dobranski's death is not ironic, but inspirational. He lived for a myth—the myth that man can be good and rational and decent—and for one year he raised his whole band of partisans to a level on which the myth temporarily became real. It is a tribute to M. Gary's artistry that we close this book feeling, not that the events of the past fifteen years have refuted the myth, but that it is our task and our heritage to continue Dobranski's work, to make the myth come true again.

MR. WILSON is a free-lance writer and a columnist for THE REALIST.

THE WAY WE SEE IT

A PORTRAIT FOR A COMMITTEE

Who does not remember the time when the American press used to make almost daily references to the effect that Soviet radios were plugged to transmission cables, thereby preventing Soviet citizens from listening to foreign broadcasts? Or, who does not recall the references to the threat to a Soviet citizen's security for merely receiving mail from abroad?

The fantasy about Soviet radio receivers was given up by the press when thousands of Americans started visiting the Soviet Union and discovered, to their amazement, that a typical Soviet receiver was equipped for short wave broadcasts and could, therefore, receive them from practically all over the world. The gadget-minded American citizen, on the other hand, has the unique disadvantage of using a radio that can receive broadcasts only from the immediate geographic vicinity.

As to foreign mail, many reports have had it that since Stalin's death it is no longer looked upon as a subversive act just to receive it. What was probably true about the Soviets

under Stalin is definitely true about these United States anno 1960. It turns out that there is a conspiracy between the Collector of Customs at the Port of New York and the House Un-American Activities Committee to violate our laws and Constitution. Not only has mail from East European countries been intercepted by custom authorities and arbitrarily classified as propaganda but it has also been passed on to the House Committee on Un-American Activities which has been maintaining dossiers on the addressees of such mail.

Wouldn't it be proper for the House Un-American Activities Committee to place a huge portrait of Stalin in its hearing chambers?

AN UNRECORDED RECORD SUPPLEMENTING RECENT REVELATIONS ABOUT SOME CONGRESSMEN'S EXPENSE ACCOUNTS

"You see, Tallulah, I ain't no ordinary guy like them guys you go out with. I'm an extraordinary citizen, Tallulah. Yep . . . hey Joe, fill up the lady's glass, willya! So, you hear me,

Tallulah, I ain't no ordinary guy . . . yep. I've got brains, integrity and leadership. Yep . . . I've got them. So the people of the United States wanted me to tell them . . . dear Tallulah, you sure have got some nice topography, gal . . . so they wanted me to tell them how to live . . . yep . . . they sent me to the U. S. Congress to tell their judges how to judge and what's good for them people.

Hey there Joe, dontya see my glass is empty?! Yep . . . put it on the bill, Joe, yessir, put it on the bill, I'm a member of your Congress, Joe. So listen, Tallulah, let's finish this here drink and go up to my room. Real nice room, Tallulah, as befits your member of Congress. Yep . . . 80 bucks a day, Tallulah. And dontya worry one bit, just be a good gal, and we'll putya on the bill, because I lead the nation and tell judges how to judge, Tallulah. Com'on let's go, I ain't got no time. See, I came on official business, as we call it, and after you, I've got to make a speech to tell them people what's right and what's wrong. Yep . . . let's go, Tallulah!"

THE SUMMIT . . . (Continued from Page 1)

spection measures to police a nuclear ban. An agonizing reappraisal of the Administration's attitude towards the summit was taking place with little effort at concealment.

Of course, it could not be expected that the President would adjudicate the controversy with an officially declared verdict. It was not long, however, before it became unmistakably clear who won the argument. Chronologically, the first indication came during a presidential press conference when President Eisenhower took great pains to deny that something Chairman Khrushchev has been calling "the spirit of Camp David" ever existed. Then followed the official communique concluding Prime Minister Macmillan's visit to Washington, which implied that substantial Soviet acceptance of Western proposals for a nuclear ban was being rejected.

Washington's reversal to total rigidity soon received official confirmation. As the summit conference approached it became important to prepare public opinion for its eventual failure that had already been decided upon. This mission was entrusted to no one less than the President and his Secretary of State. They undertook to warn against too optimistic expectations from the summit conference. Ensuing speeches by Secretary Herter, Vice-President Nixon and Under-Secretary Dillon made it perfectly clear that on the question of Berlin a policy of standing absolutely pat had been adopted.

The internal controversy within the Administration on summit conference policy was completely resolved in favor of the obstructionist faction. From that point on the diplomatic challenge turned on how to maneuver the Soviet Government into actions that would make it appear responsible for the American-desired failure of the conference. The measures to achieve this

had to be sufficiently subtle to make a dislocation of responsibility possible, yet consequential enough to discourage the Soviets and provoke them into rejecting an effective conference.

Of course, the broad hints on Western rigidity regarding Berlin might have sufficed to cool Soviet hopes for a significant diplomatic accommodation at the summit. It might have, but not necessarily. Chances were that the Soviets would agree to postpone the solution of the Berlin problem "in return" for an agreement on a nuclear test ban or disarmament. Had that become their position, and had they agreed to make additional concessions "in return" for a nuclear ban and/or disarmament, the West would have had to comply, however reluctantly. To avert such a possibility consistent steps were undertaken.

President Eisenhower announced a resumption of this country's underground A-tests. Whether, as later claimed, the resumption was not intended for military purposes is less important than the fact that the original communique contained no hint of the non-military nature of the new tests. In the absence of such assurances there can be no doubt that either no such limitations were originally intended or, if they were, the President deliberately used the occasion to provoke Soviet apprehension. Then came the spy plane affair.

Power's political rather than military mission was so important as the final step in provoking Soviet conversion from summit enthusiasm to summit reluctance that, contrary to popular belief, no chances whatever were taken to let it fail. One need hardly be a military expert to perceive the fallacy that Powers' mission was essential to the security of this nation and might have potentially averted, or warned us about, a surprise missile attack. How Powers' aerial camera could achieve this must puzzle all the experts. How could a single plane, flying over a narrow corridor across the Soviet Union detect and watch simultaneously all bases from which Soviet Intercontinental Bal-

listic Missiles can be launched? How crucial was it to have a photographer in Soviet skies for several hours only? What if a surprise attack were to occur after his safe landing in Norway, as originally planned? How would a warning about the imminent firing of missiles be issued unless CONSTANT and TOTAL surveillance of the U.S.S.R. was maintained? What military nonsense have the American people been fed?!

Of course, no one on this side of the ocean planned or wished Powers' plane to be shot down. But there seems to have been a definite plan to have his plane detected by the Russians: he was assigned an air route of thousands of miles over Soviet territory. If the Soviets failed to detect the plane within the first hundred miles, they were given another hundred miles. If they failed to detect it within the first thousand miles, they were given another thousand miles. And had this too failed, who knows whether Powers had not been instructed to circle over Moscow or another metropolitan area until he was detected by the Soviets in order to put them on notice of the kind and extent of the hopes they could entertain with regard to the summit conference?

Khrushchev's blast against the United States on May 7th was in substance disappointingly mild to Washington; it did not alleviate the "danger" of having to negotiate with the Soviets at the forthcoming summit conference. "I fully admit," said Khrushchev, "that the President did not know that a plane was sent beyond the Soviet frontier and did not return," thereby desperately clinging to a far-fetched theory that would still allow him to meet and negotiate with the President. This exculpatory attitude was the more ominous to Washington because Mr. Khrushchev had also insisted that the incident need not affect the summit conference.

The implications were not lost on Washington; Khrushchev had to be encouraged to take a less forgiving position. On May 9th Secretary Herter issued a statement that obviously set out to wreck the bridge Khrushchev had left open: he declared that all U-2 flights had been ordered by the President. To make matters worse the same statement was carefully worded to imply that further flights would be made.

Still the Soviet Government failed to respond in the irrevocably negative manner Washington must have hoped for. On May 11th Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko said in a press conference that there was "one condition" for the summit and that was that "similar provocations must be stopped." Had President Eisenhower announced the discontinuation of the flights, the entire issue would have probably been resolved. That the President did not say anything to this effect is the more surprising—and therefore bespeaks his intentions—because subsequently, in Paris, he claimed that orders to discontinue the flights had been issued even before he left for Paris.

Khrushchev still did not give up. He arrived in Paris two days ahead of schedule in the apparent hope that informal negotiations would produce some American assurances that would save the summit. It is obvious that Khrushchev was willing, even then, to settle for much less than humiliating the President; the statement he submitted to President de Gaulle did not contain the tough conditions that were later added to it. It demanded neither a condemnation of the Powers' flight nor a pledge to refrain from further flights nor the punishment of those guilty of violating Soviet air space. The temporary withholding of these conditions indicates Khrushchev's intention to make an American pledge to refrain from future flights possible without it appearing as a concession to a Soviet ultimatum.

Instead, President Eisenhower announced the discontinuation of the flights for his term of office, thereby implicitly reserving America's "right" to penetrate the Soviet's air space at its own discretion. Although it is true that the President cannot determine the policies of his successor, international law prevents any American president from appropriating another country's sovereignty to our private discretion and jurisdiction. The constitutional limitations on the President do not prevent him from pledging his country, himself and his successors not to take actions we have no right to take in the first place. When the President has unhesitatingly pledged his country's—and not just

his Administration's—opposition to aggressive wars, can international lawlessness be left to the whims of a new administration?

If it is correct that Khrushchev seized upon the spy plane affair as a pretext for wrecking the summit conference, the pretext was seized upon for very serious reasons. It is not unreasonable to argue that had Khrushchev been led to expect concrete achievements at the summit, he might have reacted to the spy plane in a manner that would not preclude the conference. But in the face of obvious American determination not to let the conference be successful, there was no reason whatever for Khrushchev to swallow extreme abuse to his country.

Following the President's implicit insistence that Soviet sovereignty fell within America's jurisdiction, Khrushchev's blast in Paris was to be expected. What was unexpected, taking the American Government by surprise, was his amazing restraint during his subsequent visit to Berlin. For a moment it seemed that Khrushchev might reverse himself and, letting bygones be bygones, put the West once more in the position of having truly to negotiate. From Paris to Berlin, crisis followed crisis. In Paris the summit conference was shattered, while in Berlin Khrushchev's behavior "threatened" a possible resumption of immediate negotiations. Something had to be done immediately to forestall any reversal that might lead to negotiations. Khrushchev had to be made to cling to his negative position.

Even after Herter's statement involving the President in the U-2 flights, there was an implicit agreement by everybody to absolve President Eisenhower of PERSONAL and DIRECT responsibility for Power's mission. Herter's communique suggested nothing more than a general and long-standing authorization. Now, however, a switch of emphasis took place; the President himself volunteered to increasingly construe his responsibility as very direct and very personal indeed. The same switch of emphasis occurred with regard to Secretary of Defense Gates' order for an "information" alert in the armed forces. While originally the Secretary himself had assumed all responsibility for that provocative action, now, to utterly confound Khrushchev, it was admitted time and again that the President had personally authorized the alert.

That the President had personally ordered both Powers' pre-summit flight and Gates' summit alert was a foregone conclusion. If, nevertheless, this was originally neither conceded nor insisted upon by Khrushchev, the sole reason for such pretended naivete was that the Soviets could not possibly negotiate with an American President personally involved in such anti-Soviet acts. President Eisenhower's determination not to be absolved of responsibility for these steps must necessarily have been calculated to bring about such an eventuality: to create a situation in which Khrushchev could not possibly reverse himself and once again meet with Eisenhower.

After the final wrecking of the Paris conference, the scheme for preventing serious negotiations was carried further. The fiasco at the summit is also being used to demonstrate the alleged impracticality of summitry, a theory that rounds out the great "achievement" of the obstructionists; to avert diplomatic negotiations.

In spite of this "success", neither President Eisenhower nor those who have won him over to their anti-negotiation policy are probably completely happy with the results. There was just too much genuine embarrassment involved and those who report the President in a rather gloomy mood are probably correct. Still, there can be little doubt that basically the President and his foreign policy advisors consider that developments followed their intended course. Gloomy moods notwithstanding, chances are that, had they had an opportunity to re-enact the entire historic chapter, their roles and actions would essentially remain the same. How else can one explain Secretary Herter's conversion from pre-summit pessimism to post-summit optimism?—During a hearing before the Senate Appropriations Committee on June 21st Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson said: "I don't get the impression that the summit worked out too well." The Secretary of State retorted: "Obviously there have been some setbacks, but the effort we have made has paid off EXTREMELY WELL."

From READERS' LETTERS

COURAGE MAKES A MAJORITY

... My husband and I are fond of quoting "One man with courage makes a majority," when we feel that a good cause needs our support.

Lexington, Mass.

MRS. ARTHUR M. LASSEK.

"ANY MAN'S DEATH DIMINISHES ME . . ."

I have enjoyed very much reading your publication. Your emphasis on personal conscience and your concern with fundamental moral issues in relation to current events are refreshing and encouraging.

I would be interested in your views on the Elchmann case. One would hope that more members of minority groups would learn compassion from previous persecution, but I guess it is always the exception who does. And as a member of the so-called majority, I am told I cannot understand because I did not suffer loss. I have been under the impression I have . . .

New York, N. Y.

ANN MORRISSETT,

American Committee on Africa.

TO PARTICIPATE IN "THE MINORITY OF ONE"

I find myself in agreement with each enthusiastic comment on THE MINORITY OF ONE. But even if I were not so completely in agreement, I would still think that what you are doing is of greatest importance. I believe in freedom and genuine democracy. It can be developed, extended and defended only as we exercise our privilege and duty of political participation. Not each of us can publish a paper as you do, but we who believe with you can participate by supporting you. In the existing circumstances it will be a miracle if you succeed with this publication. But this is a miracle that is greatly needed for the preservation and extension of freedom and democracy. People like myself can do little. But in conjunction with others I would make a great effort to keep THE MINORITY OF ONE in existence. I think the enthusiastic readers of the publication could and should be organized into financial guarantors—a group that would say: "We will not permit this publication to be stopped by financial pressure."

San Francisco, Calif. SELDON OSBORNE.

JUSTIFIES HITLER'S PERSECUTIONS

... Your A Personal Note From the Editor was incomplete and one-sided. To be fair you should have stated the case of the German people when speaking of the persecutions by Hitler. I am familiar with what occurred in Germany in the years after World War I. A horde of rapacious, horny-handed money lenders descended like a plague of locusts on a defeated Christian people. They took advantage of the misery and suffering of fellow humans without showing the mercy they later (and still do) looked for.

You should have learned your lesson. With this record your publication will not last very long.

New York, N. Y.

H. EISMANN.

READING WITH A SENSE OF SHAME

I have read and enjoyed every word of the May issue even though many of the things filled me with a sense of shame and anger. Your front page article, *Toward the Summit: A Predetermined Failure?*, proved to be quite prophetic. I shall be looking forward to your future articles on the real causes of the collapse of the summit meeting and compare them with the statements in the daily press, over radio and TV.

It is so refreshing and such a boost to one's longing and desire for a saner and better world to find someone who has the courage and the ability to launch a magazine devoted to working toward this goal. May you be very successful in your efforts to carry on the work. I hope THE MINORITY OF ONE grows and grows and that its readers will run into the millions, its influence and message spread rapidly.

Peace through understanding and negotiations, with sincerity and not through militarism and the threat of force, is what the world needs and must strive for. I am subscribing to your magazine to help the work along, for I want to live, not die.

Roche Harbor, Wash.

F. R. SCOTT.

PRAYS FOR CONTINUATION

I am very much enthused about your Journal, your work and your aims. I certainly hope and pray that your work and the publication will not be discontinued.

Rochester, N. Y.

RABBI HERBERT BRONSTEIN.

ADMIRING "COURAGE"

... I admire a man with an opinion and the nerve to express it, and what little I can do I am glad to do it.

East Prairie, Mo.

W. H. GRISSOM, Att'y.

GALILEO WAS RIGHT

The minority of one has always been right. Galileo was right. Columbus was right. Then there were Stephenson, Watt, Whitney, Bell, Edison and many others. Where would we be today if they had listened to the "smart" majority?

Winfield, Texas

A. E. CAMPBELL.

A GIFT SUBSCRIPTION TO A SPECIAL PREACHER

Because your publication serves a great need and a high purpose I want to support it. If it meets with your approval, please, send a gift subscription either to Sen. Fulbright or—preferably—to President Eisenhower's parish minister.

Ridgewood, N. Y.

RUTH MARTIN.

"VERY DEFINITELY ALL RIGHT!"

I do not know where you obtained my name but it is quite all right. Oh, very DEFINITELY all right! It is so heartening to learn of the existence of another "minority of one"—they are so few! When your paper arrived, I wanted to halt all operations and read every word. Alas, there are the cares and interruptions of the day . . . to say nothing of the failure of the summit. Tell me, Sir, are you "insulted," as we are being told to be, by Mr. Khrushchev's rude conduct? I am not. But I am rather ashamed of our President. Mr. K. was rude, does that argue he wasn't right?

Oaklyn, N. J.

(Mrs.) GERTRUDE CUNNINGHAM.

SHE NEVER HEARD OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

This date I received a copy of your publication and a copy of THE CATHOLIC VIRGINIAN. Although both publications are published in Richmond, Va., I am sure my name was not secured from THE CATHOLIC VIRGINIAN to which I am a regular subscriber. I cannot understand how you are permitted to send material that is so offensive to the American way of life.

Arlington, Va.

MRS. KARL J. BILEK.

NOT SINCE HALDERMAN . . .

Not since the days of Halderman have I found a magazine as interesting, stimulating and thought provoking as THE MINORITY OF ONE. I think you have met the problems and issues of today with courage and daring.

Camarillo, Calif.

EDNA NIELSON.

AN APPRECIATED SALUTE

May I salute the excellence of your May issue which is every bit as good as those which have gone before it and again makes me wonder at the wide range of subjects about which you are unusually well informed and about which you write with exceptional clarity.

JUSTIN BLACKWELDER

Executive Secretary

Atlantic Union Committee

Washington, D. C.

"KEEP GOING UNTIL APPRECIATED"

You are doing a fine editorial job and I hope you are able to find the subscriptions to keep it going. Considering the condition of the commercial press, it seems obvious that efforts of this sort will some day become a vital current in the life of the people, providing such papers can keep going until they are appreciated.

Los Angeles, Calif.

HENRY GEIGER.
For the MANAS Staff

A WELCOME EXCEPTION MADE

Being a student of limited means, I recently resolved not to subscribe to any more publications languishing on the brink of a financial precipice. After pursuing two recent issues of THE MINORITY OF ONE, however, I feel I would certainly be remiss were I not to do my small part to keep alive one of the most dynamic and outspoken journals I have ever come across. I have passed along my copies to several of my friends, and they have expressed as much enthusiasm as I. America needs more voices like yours.

New York, N. Y.

JAY P. KATZ.

A MUTUAL PRIVILEGE

I wish I could tell you what a sense of privilege and pleasure I have in sending you this check for a subscription to your wonderful magazine.

I hope that you realize how much happiness and courage you give to us floundering, voiceless ones.

LILLA KALMAN.

New York, N. Y.

IT IS A MAN'S WORLD

It has been my good fortune to be the recipient of your fine publication. In this chaotic century it is a ray of hope that man has not become completely mute to the urging of conscience. From your heroic effort others will arise and join in the song of freedom.

It is not a simple matter for a woman to carry moral placards. For in truth, this is man's primary responsibility. However, she has to forsake her femininity in favor of justice. You have quickened the heartbeat and added fuel to the innermost care of the soul. The seeds have been sown, although one lone contribution has been the result of planting. But patience has its own reward, and it is my sincerest hope to be able to make further contributions.

MRS. GORDON WEINER.

Magnolia, Mass.

"WHAT IS REALLY HAPPENING IN CUBA?"

I am going to thank my friend T. E. for sending you my name.

You are to be congratulated for donating a page of your valuable magazine to "What is Really Happening in Cuba?" One of the very few other sympathetic voices was that on the NBC television program "Brief In Session" with Lion Pearson as moderator. Discussing Cuba and Castro all the participants agreed that the Cuban Revolution was long overdue and that we coddled Batista too long. One man on the panel remarked that Herbert Matthews of the NEW YORK TIMES was the only newspaperman who criticized the press for not telling the truth about Cuba, that its revolution was the biggest story since our own revolution. Yet, one must ask, what about Castro? Is he a liberator or a dictator? Why does he insult this nation? Why doesn't he write to THE NEW YORK TIMES and deny the stuff NEWSWEEK and other magazines and newspapers have been writing about him? Here is your chance to become the first vanguard for the truth and for the preservation of freedom in Cuba. Sponsor another page and ask for contributions to cover the cost. I am enclosing a donation for that purpose.

BEN CAPES.

St. Louis, Mo.

WHAT ABOUT THE CASTRO TRIALS?

How do you excuse the farcical trials and executions as well as the closing down of newspapers in Cuba? These are facts, not newspaper distortions; though the latter are regrettably all too common. Why do you oppose "My country right or wrong" thinking (as I do) but then turn around and adopt a "Unionism right or wrong" philosophy? It is ridiculous to apologize for using a non-union printing plant. Labor excesses need criticizing in these times as much as any other abuse of power.

Aside from these two points, THE MINORITY OF ONE appears to me well worth supporting. I like your humanistic approach to political and social problems, and hope you will remain non-partisan in the sense of criticizing anyone and anything that needs to be criticized, regardless of race, creed, color or party. Let us not pay lip service to Unionism, Business, political lines or anything else that reeks of dogma.

Washington, D. C.

RICHARD HALL.

(EDITOR'S NOTE: We regret that each issue of THE MINORITY OF ONE cannot reflect ALL its views on specific matters. While we have attempted to expose the distortions of the American press with regard to Cuba, Dr. Castro has gained no sanctuary from criticism by us. The article "Something Has Got To Give In Cuba," in the February, 1960 issue of THE MINORITY should convince the correspondent that we have been critical of the Castro trials. Nor is organized labor immune from our criticism, even though we do recognize in the current wave of compromising labor a deliberate conspiracy that is not inspired by moral considerations. Our regret for not having been able to use a unionized printing plant stems from our proposition that labor needs to be organized in order to make a full contribution to society but not in order to breed corruption. Beginning with this issue, however, we have succeeded in securing the services of a UNIONIZED printing plant.)

"KEEP PUNCHING!"

It is the best and the hardest hitting little magazine I've read in a long, long time. Keep punching. Your shots will some day awaken the American people and they will see the rot and corruption surrounding them. Then they will know they were fed half truths and lies by the captured press. More power to you!

Coadale, Pa.

JOHN V. CASSMAN.

WORD FROM WALDO FRANK

I got the May 1960 issue of your excellent magazine. May I send a contribution for its continuance and health—and for yours personally.

Cordially,

Truro, Mass.

WALDO FRANK.

A Candid Word To Our Moral Supporters

The decreased number of pages in this issue as well as the single color have been imposed by financial difficulties. This issue has also been printed in a very limited number of copies, which precludes reaching a wider readership.

From previous notes from the editor you must be aware that this publication venture is not intended for profits. The personal financial means that made it possible are completely exhausted. Were it not for the generous response of some subscribers, this as well as the preceding issue would have been impossible. We wish to take this opportunity to express our heartfelt thanks to those subscribers and especially to:

Mr. & Mrs. Merritt Abrash	Dr. David Margolis
Mr. Walter Ackerman	Mr. Howard Lee Miller
Mr. & Mrs. Steve Allen	Mr. Edward Olson
Mrs. George W. Angell	Mr. Selden Osborne
Dr. & Mrs. R. Barr	Dr. Samuel Newman
Mr. Justin Blackwelder	Mrs. Harry A. Phillips
Miss Lola Boswell, Att'y	Miss Mary Phillips
Mr. Louis M. Cariello	Mrs. Gertrude Russell
Mr. Gordon W. Johnson	Mr. Tad Tekla
Dr. Lawrence Kalom	Dr. Ernest B. Zeisler
Mr. John E. Leonard	Mr. Carl H. Zipse

Unfortunately, promising negotiations recently conducted with an interested publisher, who was considering backing THE MINORITY OF ONE, have failed due to the unavailability of capital. Now the continuation of this periodical squarely depends on the initiative of its readers and subscribers. Considering the enthusiastic response with which it has been received, we feel justified in believing that just a few more issues will make it a self-supporting project.

Some subscribers have suggested the establishment of a Subscribers' Committee to help promote and finance THE MINORITY OF ONE. The intention of this note is to solicit membership for

that committee. Those willing to help us with their ideas and promotional efforts are requested to communicate with Mrs. Gertrude Russell, c/o THE MINORITY OF ONE. A complete and detailed financial account will be submitted to the Subscribers' Committee.

Our own continued effort is, of course, assured, but THE MINORITY OF ONE can no longer be sustained as a one-man project.

The struggle for peace in this divided and sick world is difficult. So is the struggle to reform society into a healthier and happier one. For this purpose people all over the world have proved willing to make the greatest personal sacrifices. From the student revolutionaries in Korea and Turkey to Albert Schweitzer in the African jungles men have been willing to give up their personal comforts, and even their lives, for the brighter future of mankind. We do not wish to be presumptuous comparing ourselves to these heroic men and women, but if THE MINORITY OF ONE can contribute, however little, to this historic surge towards peace and progress, it would not be asking too much of its moral supporters to ensure the publication's continuity and future. Everyone inspired by the ideals of THE MINORITY OF ONE must be willing to make unselfish efforts and to join the emerging international forces that are working for peace and humanism—some through material sacrifice, some through physical suffering and some even by giving their lives. If their sacrifices can be so great, your own relatively small sacrifice may be expected, even demanded.

A collective effort on the part of its subscribers will easily ensure the continuance of THE MINORITY OF ONE; lack of such effort will doom it. From here on the decision rests with you.

SUBSCRIPTION FORM

THE MINORITY OF ONE, INC.

P. O. Box 6594

Richmond 30, Va.

ALSO ENTER GIFT SUBSCRIPTIONS AT THE RATE OF \$4.00 PER YEAR FOR:

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Of What I Am Ashamed:

► OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S \$89,-400 furniture purchase from the son of the Secretary of Commerce Frederick H. Mueller.

► OF THE AMERICAN PRESS' misrepresentation of the Cuban trial of Manuel Beaton and two accomplices on charges of double murder as an "instance" of Castro's use of the judiciary to silence political opposition.

► OF THE ESSO STANDARD, TEXACO AND SHELL companies for refusing to process crude oil purchased from Russia in their Cuban refineries.

► OF SENATOR CLAIR ENGLE'S refutation of the Antarctic Pact signed by 12 nations, including the U. S. and U.S.S.R., providing that Antarctica will be developed and used only for peaceful purposes.

► OF THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE for turning the long overdue appointment of additional federal judges into partisan bargaining for the placement of political proteges on the bench.

► OF GENERAL MOTORS AND THE DEMOCRATIC HEADQUARTERS for the former's putting 250 cars at the disposal of the Democratic national convention.

► OF AMA'S HOUSE OF DELEGATES annual convention's uncompromising identification of all and any public health programs with ultimate evil.

► OF CONGRESSIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE ADMINISTRATION in authorizing the President to cut the Cuban sugar quota, and of the dishonest claim that such legislation is not intended as a punitive measure against the Government of Dr. Castro.

► OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S pressure upon the Senate to minimize federal school aid legislation.

► OF FORMER PRESIDENT HARRY S. TRUMAN for linking the Southern Negro sit-in movement with Communism.

► OF SENATOR GEORGE SMATHERS' campaign to whitewash the tyranny of Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic.

► OF SECRETARY OF STATE CHRISTIAN A. HERTER'S opposition to future summit conferences.

► OF LOCAL 371 OF THE AFL-CIO Textile Workers Union in Front Royal, Va., for leading the fight against the desegregation of schools in Warren County.

► OF PRESIDENT EISENHOWER ordering the termination of economic aid to Cuba.

► OF CHAIRMAN JOHN A. McCONE of the Atomic Energy Commission for advocating a resumption of A-tests by the United States.

► OF THE HOUSE RULES COMMITTEE for attempting to block legislation on federal aid for school construction as well as minimum wage legislation, both bills being completely inadequate anyway.

► OF THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE for approving a bill to legalize the use of wiretap evidence in state criminal prosecutions in states that permit wire tapping.

► OF THE AMERICAN LEGION'S CONVENTION in San Francisco, California, whose delegates manhandled peaceful pickets whose signs called on the Legion to reverse its policies with regard to the United Nations and civil liberties.

THE MINORITY OF ONE carries no specific political message. Its name derives from its purpose—to contribute to the individual's intellectual self-assertion. You and I are the minorities of one, if only we do not fear our thoughts. Our thoughts may collide, or they may coincide or complement each other, but even then let us each remain a minority of one. If you lend us support on this, no matter how many of our specific views you may dissent from, we believe you to be our friend.

Page 12 • July 1960 • **THE MINORITY OF ONE**

FACTS VERSUS FICTION IN CUBA

THE FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE continues to publish a weekly bulletin devoted to authoritative news reporting from Cuba. It counteracts the slanting propaganda conspiracy in which most of the American press has been participating.

Obtain a true picture of the Cuban situation by writing for free literature to:

The Fair Play For Cuba Committee
60 East 42nd Street
New York 17, N. Y.

On Standing Up

The following editorial, reprinted here by permission, appeared in *THE WASHINGTON POST* on June 18, 1960.

It must have taken an extraordinary lot of character and courage for young Stephen Bayne to stand up, as he did the other evening, and decline an award from the American Legion. The 17-year-old high school boy's name was called out at the Senior Awards Night of his school in Westbury, L. I., as the winner of a citizenship award from the local Legion post. In the presence of about 1,000 assembled classmates, parents and school officials, he said: "Wait! I refuse to accept an award from an organization whose policies I can't respect."

Setting aside the question whether his scruples were wise or foolish, his observance of them commands respect. It is not easy for a youngster to forgo a prize or so conspicuously to defy the conventions. This was not an unruly or generally disrespectful student. Stephen Bayne was president of the Westbury High School student organization; he graduated among the 10 top students in his class; he won a scholarship to Harvard College, and he also won, in addition to the Legion award, special prizes for music, science, Spanish, history and English, plus an award from the Parent-Teacher Association. He seems to be quite a boy.

The school authorities responded to what they termed his "bad manners" by apologizing to the Legion and by giving the history and English prizes won by Stephen to two of his classmates, who promptly, and very properly in our judgment, rejected them on the ground that they had been earned by Stephen and belonged to him. The school ought to feel pretty proud of these three youngsters. They have behaved with an independence and integrity all too rare in contemporary life. Some words of Judge Learned Hand are worth remembering:

Our dangers, as it seems to me, are not from the outrageous but from the conforming; not from those who rarely and under the lurid glare of obloquy upset our moral complaisance or shock us with unaccustomed conduct but from those, the mass of us, who take their virtues and their tastes, like their shirts and their furniture, from the limited patterns which the market offers.

Copies of back issues of
THE MINORITY OF ONE
are still available at 50¢

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reading this publication.
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